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NOTES
agency, his animal escapes from a fenced close and runs onto the
highway where it causes damage. Where there is no ordinance
prohibiting owners from permitting their stock to run at large,
the owner is not negligent in permitting them to be at large.
Thus it has been held that the owner of stock is not liable for
damages to a passing car;22 and that he may recover if his animal
is injured.2 3 Where animals are being lawfully driven along the
highway and one escapes and causes damage, the owner is not
liable, regardless of the fact that an ordinance exists.2 4
In earlier times many United States courts entirely rejected
the rule of strict liability for animal trespasses, as contrary to
local custom; but as the country has become more closely settled,
the tendency has been to restore the common law rule either by
statute or decision.2 5 The Louisiana legislature has shown con-
siderable foresight in making this question a matter of local
option, thus leaving each parish free to adopt a rule suitable to
local circumstances. As the state becomes more industrialized
and the need for a uniform law outweighs the economic burden
on the owners of animals, a general statute may be enacted which
will obligate the owner to keep his stock from running at large on
the highway, or from wandering onto the fields and gardens of
his neighbor.
C. C. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT - DIVORCE--
Petitioners were married to their respective spouses in North
Carolina, where they continued to live for a number of years.
Then they went together to Nevada, and, after remaining there
for a period of approximately six weeks, filed actions for divorce
against their respective North Carolina spouses. The defendants
in those divorce actions did not appear, nor were they served with
process in Nevada. Service was had on them through publication
and substituted service. The Nevada court found petitioners to be
bona fide and continuous residents of Nevada and the divorces
were granted. Immediately after obtaining the divorces petition-
ers were married in Nevada and returned to North Carolina. The
State of North Carolina indicted and convicted petitioners of the
22. Demarco v. Gober, 19 La. App. 236, 140 So. 64 (1932).
23. See Dunckelman v. Schockly, 183 So. 52, 53 (La. App. 1938). Recovery
not allowed as driver did all possible to prevent hitting the animal.
24. Cook v. Tooke, 17 La. App. 307, 135 So. 917 (1931).
25. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 434.
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crime of bigamy.' The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.2 Held, a decree of divorce is entitled to full
faith and credit when the court granting it has jurisdiction over
the domicile of the plaintiff, even if the defendant is served con-
structively and makes no appearance in the action. Williams v.
State of North Carolina, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942).
In upholding the conviction the supreme court of North Car-
olina relied on the case of Haddock v. Haddock.3 North Carolina
had held in several cases that a foreign decree of divorce against
a resident of North Carolina, where there had been neither per-
sonal service within the jurisdiction of the forum nor personal
appearance, was void in the state.4 Before discussing the holding
and doctrine of the Haddock case it is necessary to outline the
general principles of divorce jurisdiction. Since marriage is the
foundation of our modern organized society it is obvious that the
state has an interest in the marital status of its citizens and there-
fore it has an interest in supervising the circumstances and rules
under which such status can be legally dissolved. Divorce pro-
ceedings,. being proceedings for the dissolution of a status, are
generally considered as proceedings in rem.6 As all actions in
rem, the divorce action must be brought where the res is situated,
and here domicile becomes all-important. Since this is the basis of
divorce jurisdiction it follows that a state in which both parties
are domiciled has jurisdiction to terminate their marriage by
divorce.6 On the other hand, a state in which neither party is
domiciled has no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage relation of
the parties. 7 A divorce decree rendered in such state is therefore
not entitled to full faith and credit in the other states.8
1. State v. Williams, 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.(2d) '769 (1941).
2. Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina, 315 U.S. 795, 62 S.Ct. 918(1942).
3. 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1 (1906).
4. Arrington v. Arrington, 102 N.C. 491, 9 S.E. 200 (1889); Harris v.
Harris, 115 N.C. 587, 20 S.E. 187, (1894); State v. Herren, 175 N.C. 754, 94 S.E.
698 (1917); Pridgen v. Pridgen, 203 N.C. 533, 166 S.E. 591 (1932).
5. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws (1937) 270; Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws (1938) 342, § 128.
6. Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317, 25 S.Ct. 679, 49 L.Ed. 1066 (1905);
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1
(1906).
7. Bell v. Bell, 181 .. S. 175, 21 S.Ct. 551, 45 L.Ed. 804 (1901); Streitwolf v.
Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179, 21 S.Ct. 553, 45 L.Ed. 807 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366 (1903); Lister v. Lister, 86 N.J. Eq. 30, 97
At. 170 (1916). The cases of Andrews v. Andrews and Lister v. Lister also
illustrate the view that divorce jurisdiction will not be granted by mere ap-
pearance of the parties if there was no jurisdiction in fact.
.8. Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21 (1877); State v. Fleak, 54
Iowa 429, 6 N.W. 689 (1880); Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317, 41 Am. Rep.
507 (1881).
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A more difficult situation arises when a divorce is granted at
the domicile of one of the parties.9 The problem presented in such
a case is whether the decree is entitled to recognition in other
jurisdictions. Since the solution of this question necessarily in-
volves an interpretation of the "full faith and credit" clause of
the Federal Constitution 0 the matter is one for the Supreme
Court of the United States to adjudicate. Several situations have
been presented. Where the divorce is granted at the domicile of
either spouse and the defendant has been personally subjected
to the jurisdiction of the court it has been held that the decree
must be given full faith and credit.11 A decree of divorce likewise
has been held to be entitled to such recognition when the state
granting it had jurisdiction over the last matrimonial domicile
and the plaintiff was domiciled in the state, even though there
was neither actual service within the state nor appearance.1 2 Let
us suppose that, as in the instant case, the plaintiff in a divorce
action has wrongfully abandoned the defendant at the matrimo-
nial domicile and has acquired a new domicile in a different state
in which he secures a decree of divorce. It was held in the cele-
brated case of Haddock v. Haddock13 that such a judgment would
not be entitled to full faith and credit in the other states of the
Union. It should be observed at this point that the Haddock case
did not compel the states to refuse recognition of such decrees,
and these judgments, unless contrary to good morals and public
policy, were usually recognized on grounds of comity.14
9. In American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws (1934) 170, § 113, the following solution of the problem is presented:
"A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve the mar-
riage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the state and the other
is domiciled outside the state, if
"(a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state (1) has consented that
the other spouse acquire a separate home; or (2) by his or her misconduct
has ceased to have the right to object to the acquisition of such separate
home; or (3) is personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which
grants the divorce; or (b) the state is the last state in which the spouses
were domiciled together as man and wife."10. U.S. Const. Art. 4, § 1, provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given
in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state."
11. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108, 19 L.Ed. 604 (1869). A decree obtained
by the wife who had acquired a separate domicile in Indiana was held en-
titled to recognition in the District of Columbia when the husband had per-
sonally appeared in the action.
12. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S.Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794 (1901);
Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551, 33 S.Ct. 129, 57 L.Ed. 347 (1913).
13. 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1 (1906). This case
has been extensively discussed. Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees
for Divorce (1906) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 586; Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39
Harv. L. Rev. 417; Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock (1936)
21 Corn. L.Q. 393; Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile (1917) 27 Yale L.J. 47.
14. Crimm v. Crimm, 211 Ala. 13, 99 So. 301 (1924); Gildersleeve v. Gil-
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In the instant case, the court basing the decision on an appar-
ently broader view of the full faith and credit clause and differ-
ent conceptions of public policy expressly overruled the Haddock
case and held the Nevada decree entitled to recognition in North
Carolina. In the opinion, Haddock v. Haddock is attacked as being
contra to the historical view that a proceeding for divorce is a
proceeding in rem. The question of whether petitioners were
bona fide domiciliaries of Nevada was evaded by the court.15 The
theory behind this evasion was that since the verdict against
petitioners was a general one, and one of the grounds on which it
was rendered (the doctrine of the Haddock case) was invalid un-
der the Federal Constitution, the judgment could not be sus-
tained.1 6 In this way the case was distinguished from cases in
which the court granting the divorce has no jurisdiction over the
domicile of either party.
The decision in Williams v. State of North Carolina is a mo-
mentous one. It holds that, regardless of the reason for a separate
domicile, a divorce decree obtained at the domicile of the plaintiff
is entitled to full faith and credit. Comity is supplanted by the
imperative force of constitutional command. The shades of Mr.
and Mrs. Haddock no longer hover over the beneficiary of a "fly
by night" divorce, and his new status now has constitutional sanc-
tion.
Whether this extension of the full faith and credit clause was
desirable is a question on which disagreement will most likely
prevail. It is obvious that this new interpretation of the full faith
and credit clause will impair the proper protection of state pol-
icies in a matter of vital public interest-the marital status of
domiciliaries. Since rather obviously petitioners were never bona
fide residents of Nevada, Mr. Justice Jackson was justified in
stating in his dissenting opinion that "It is not an exaggeration
dersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684 (1914); Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62
S.E. 182, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 647 (1908); Holdorf v. Holdorf, 198 Iowa 158, 197
N.W. 910 (1924). Louisiana has followed this view. Aarnes v. Aarnes, 172 La.
648, 135 So. 13 (1931); Voorhies v. Voorhies, 184 La. 406, 166 So. 121 (1936). See
Comment (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 96.
15. The language of the court follows: "In the first place, we repeat
that in this case we must assume that petitioners had a bona fide domicil in
Nevada, not that the Nevada domicil was a sham. We thus have no question
on the present record whether a divorce decree granted by the court of one
state to a resident as distinguished from a domicilary is entitled to full faith
and credit in another state. Nor do we reach here the question as to the
power of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce
decrees because, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Caro-
lina finds that no bona fide domicil was acquired in Nevada."
16. Stomberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73
A.L.R. 1484 (1931).
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to say that this decision repeals the divorce laws of all the states
and substitutes the law of Nevada as to all marriages one of the
parties to which can afford a short trip there." Mr. Justice Mur-
phy, also dissenting, raised a very pertinent question as to wheth-
er, in an appraisement of relative jurisdictional interests, those
of Nevada could fairly be said to prevail over those of North
Carolina.'7
It has been said that "the life of the law is its ability to ad-
just itself to changing social needs" and that "the law must neces-
sarily conform, to a large extent, to prevailing community stand-
ards."'8 These concepts will help to understand the overruling of
the Haddock case. In the thirty-six years which have elapsed since
Haddock v. Haddock divorce statistics will show a steady increase
in the dissolution of marriages throughout the nation. Undoubt-
edly the Supreme Court was impressed with the necessity of
securing greater uniformity in regulation of the marital status, in
order to avoid the undesirable situation of having persons mar-
ried in one state and unmarried in the others. From such a situ-
ation serious social complications would necessarily arise.
Who can tell, however, but that this decision allowing the
spouse who has abandoned the other party to obtain a divorce
entitled to recognition will create even greater evils.
It is submitted that the advantages of uniformity were scarce-
ly a sufficient reason for thus sacrificing the right of the indi-
vidual states to govern the marital relations of their citizens. In
effect it tends to force the divorce standards of all states down to
the level of those jurisdictions which have chosen, for not too
laudable reasons, to make the dissolution of the marital status a
perfunctory matter.
R'R.A.
CRIMINAL LAW-ASPORTATION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
LARCENY-Defendant was charged, under the cattle stealing act,'
17. As stated by Murphy, J., in the dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court
has "recognized an area of flexibility in the application of the clause to pre-
serve and protect state policies in matters of public concern. We have said
that conflicts between such state policies should be resolved 'not by giving
automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause . . . but by appraising the
governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight.'" Alaska Packer's Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm., 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 S.Ct. 518, 527, 79 L.Ed. 1044, 1052 (1935).
18. Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce (1935) 2 Law & Comtemp.
Prob. 335, 341.
1. La. Act 64 of 1910 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1057].
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